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COMPARING LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA AND VIETNAM: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
John Gillespie and Albert H.Y. Chen 
Published John Gillespie and Albert Chen eds., Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A 
Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes, London: Routledge 2010 1-26] 
Mapping the Comparative Terrain 
 
For many decades, global discourse about legal development has been dominated by Western 
notions of rule of law and liberal democracy. Although this dialogue is diverse and reflects 
temporal and geographic variations, until comparatively recently it stared down challenges from 
religious fundamentalism, Fascism, Marxist-Leninism, and other meta-theories. The gradual shift 
of economic power from the West to North East Asia over the last 40 years, and to China more 
recently, presents a new and distinctive challenge to Western domination over global 
development discourse.
1
 
 
To explore this phenomenon, we argue that it is necessary to abandon, or at least suspend, the 
belief that “global culture,” which developed out of the European Enlightenment and diffused 
worldwide through imperialism and imitation, is an irresistible socializing force.
2
 We need to 
                                                 
1
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consider the possibility that “global culture,” which now includes North East Asian influences, 
does not invariably produce local variations of Western or North East Asian legal development 
in socialist Asia.
3
 These models are important but may not be the only reference points for legal 
development elsewhere in Asia. 
 
This volume explores whether there is a distinctive Chinese legal development model, and if so, 
whether it is likely to form the nucleus of an alternate global vision for legal development in 
Asia and beyond. Just what a Chinese development model might look like is difficult to pin 
down, since China has borrowed from many external sources, is changing rapidly and varies 
considerably from region to region. Taking this diversity into account, Randall Peerenboom in 
this volume argues that China is as a non-democratic, export-oriented, open, and yet not 
neoliberal developmental state. He believes that China has selectively adapted the Western 
(Washington consensus) and North East Asian development models, but remains open to the 
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3
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and Taiwan, replicate Western ideas. See John Ohnesorge, ‘Politics, Ideology and Legal System Reform in 
Northeast Asia’, in Christoph Antons and Volkmar Gessner, eds., Globalisation and Resistance: Law Reform in 
Asia since the Crisis, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007 pp.105–30; Tom Ginsburg and Albert Chen, eds., 
Administrative Law and the Judicialization of Governance in Asia, London: Routledge, 2008. 
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growing literature that portrays Chinese legal development as distinctive and an alternative to 
other models.
4
  
 
As China’s economic rise becomes clearer, especially following the recent international financial 
crisis, its development model seems to attract more admirers in Asia and beyond.
5
 The Chinese 
model may be difficult to resist by leaders in countries like Vietnam that are interested in 
boosting their economy while curbing social and political pluralism. Adding to its allure, in 2005 
China became Vietnam’s largest trading partner and in 2008 bilateral trade exceeded US$15 
billion.
6
 Even countries such as Thailand and Indonesia that are pursuing a more liberal 
development trajectory may increasingly turn to China for inspiration as the disparity in 
economic power increases. To put this relationship into perspective, when China first proposed 
trade talks with ASEAN in 1990 its GDP was 1.12 times larger than ASEAN’s combined GDP. 
By 1999 the lead increased to 1.82 and in 2004 its GDP was 2.15 times larger.
7
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 See, for example, Jurgen Haacke, ‘The Significance of Beijing’s Bilateral Relations: Looking “Below” the 
Regional Level in China-ASEAN Ties’, in H.K. Leong and S.C. Ku, eds., In China and Southeast Asia: Global 
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University of Pittsburg Press, 2007. 
6
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A central aim of this volume is not only understand to what exogenous and endogenous and 
influences have shaped Chinese legal development, but also to assess the applicability of the 
Chinese model to other countries in Asia. Vietnam was selected as a test case, because at least on 
the surface it seems a likely candidate to emulate the Chinese model. China and Vietnam have 
much in common – a Confucian past, socialist influenced legal systems, and rapidly developing 
economies and societies. Vietnam’s geography and history has sensitized it to developments in 
China. For a thousand years China ruled Vietnam and for another thousand years Vietnamese 
rulers looked to China as a source of ideas about statecraft. After China, Vietnam has the fastest 
growing economy in Asia.
8
 Its legal and governance structures share some striking similarities 
with those in China, as does its understanding about the objectives of legal development. It too 
has experienced rapid economic growth without the trappings of a Western democracy or a fully 
functioning rights-based legal system. Although the sequencing of reforms differs, each country 
has enacted comprehensive legislative frameworks, and they are gradually reforming their legal 
institutions.  
 
These similarities have attracted growing interest by economists
9
 and political scientists,
10
 but 
this volume is the first comprehensive attempt to comparatively assess legal development in 
                                                 
8
 See Jorn Dosch and Alexander Vuving, ‘The Impact of China on Governance Structures in Vietnam’, Discussion 
Paper, Bonn: Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik, 2008, p.24. 
9
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Growth and Development, Washington: World Bank, 2008. 
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 See Jorn Dosch and Alexander Vuving, op. cit., n.8 above; Regina Abrami, Edmund Malesky, and Yu Zheng, 
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these countries. Some commentators assume that Vietnam is a smaller version of China, but 
Vietnamese scholars in this volume point to the differences residing within the similarities. Most 
differences are found below the surface level of statutory norms and legal institutions in the 
conceptual and procedural approaches to legal development and governance. The differences are 
also to be found in the myriad ways officials, citizens, and business groups interpret and 
implement the law.  
 
Paying attention to these differences will assist our inquiry into whether there is a distinctive 
Chinese legal development model, or whether China is better understood as a variation on a 
broader East Asian developmental theme. The similarities and differences also have much to tell 
us about the likelihood of other countries replicating the Chinese model. If the model encounters 
difficulties in a culturally and politically similar country like Vietnam, it may be too dependent 
on Chinese conditions to reproduce similar results elsewhere. The chapters in this volume 
combine ‘micro’ or interpretive methods with ‘macro’ or structural traditions to produce a 
nuanced account of legal reforms in China and Vietnam.  
 
Comparing China and Vietnam  
 
To compare legal development in China and Vietnam, we propose avoiding conventional forms 
of analysis based on legal traditions and legal culture.
11
 Analysis of this kind, we argue, registers 
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 For a critical analysis of comparative law see Pip Nicholson and Sarah Biddulph, eds., Examining Practice, 
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inconsistencies and incompatibilities between essentialized representations of legal culture, and 
as a consequence cannot account for the observed degree of fragmentation and regionalization in 
China and Vietnam.
12 More importantly, as David Pollack charges, “homogeneous, holistic 
notions of culture… cannot provide an explanation for social and cultural change.”13 Further 
complicating legal cultural analysis, in socialist Asia comparison does not progress far without 
moving beyond legal traditions to consider other sources of social ordering such as political, 
regulatory, and moral governance. In addition, comparative analysis needs to recognize the limits 
of the power of law. This is because law does not so much control behaviour as coordinate 
among a number of other, often non-state, regulatory systems.
14
 All this suggests that a 
comparative analysis needs to range beyond conventional comparative approaches and consider 
modes of analysis that examine state, non-state, and hybrid regulatory regimes.  
 
To discuss and compare legal development in China and Vietnam we propose five modes of 
analysis that have been synthesized from the comparative law and social science literature. The 
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following discussion uses these modes to examine the history and sequencing of legal 
development, paying particular attention to Chinese influence over Vietnam. The neglect of 
history invites mechanistic comparison, because history provides an empirical dimension to test 
the soundness of inferences and suppositions. None of the five comparative modes is intended to 
function on its own, but in combination they provide ways to understand the interaction between 
China and Vietnam. The five modes are:  
 foreign imposition 
 deference 
 international integration 
 borrowing  
 diffusion.  
 
Foreign imposition  
 
Pre-modern Chinese imposition 
 
The foreign imposition of laws and regulations occurs when governance structures are forced on 
countries by foreign powers.
15
 For millennia, legal systems around the world have developed 
through this process. 
 
Some of the best-documented impositions occurred during the military 
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and Social Control, New York: Academic Press, 1979.  
8 
 
expansion of the Roman Empire and Chinese domination in Vietnam from 112 BC to AD 939.
16
 
During this period Chinese thinking and practices became the central point of reference for 
Vietnamese elites. Chinese scholarship, political theories, religious values, family structures, and 
bureaucratic practices indoctrinated and molded, though never entirely supplanted, indigenous 
Vietnamese outlooks.
17
 Chinese rulers modified their governance system in Vietnam, placing 
their faith in legalism (fa), rather than humanistic moral persuasion (li), to control the “resistive 
and morally unperfected” indigenous population.18 Isolated from Chinese rule, Vietnamese 
language and culture survived in the villages. Long after independence, Chinese thinking 
continued to influence local rulers and actually gained in prestige during the fifteenth century, 
reaching a zenith in the mid-nineteenth century.
19
  
 
French colonial imposition (1864–1954)  
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 See Ellen Goodman, The Origins of the Western Legal Tradition, Federation Press, Sydney, 1995, pp.131–36; 
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In an age of European colonialism in East Asia, French colonial rule officially began when the 
Vietnamese Emperor, Tu Duc, signed a treaty ceding three provinces to France in 1862.
20
 But 
unlike the imposition of Chinese governance almost a two thousand years earlier, colonial 
legality did not take hold beyond the small colonial enclaves and had surprisingly little lasting 
impact. French laws rarely touched the lives of most Vietnamese because most people were 
isolated from the colonial economy.
21
 Even the small population of urban Vietnamese was 
ambivalent about the colonial model. As Nguyen Tuong Tam noted:  
 
Each side has its good points and its bad points, and it is not yet certain where morality lies. 
But when the old civilization is brought out and put into practice before our very eyes, we 
are dissatisfied with the results. We can only continue to hope in Western civilization. 
Where that civilization will lead us, we do not know. But our destiny is to travel into the 
unknown, to keep changing and progressing.
22
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Nationalists and Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in Asia reacted differently to colonial legal 
systems. For example, nationalists in China during the Republican period (1912–1949)23 and a 
few urban intellectuals in Vietnam
24
 turned to European constitutionalism to galvanize 
opposition to colonial domination. For revolutionaries, however, contradictions between the 
harsh implementation of colonial law and its lofty idealism (democracy, liberty, and equality) 
excited radical opposition to the imposed legal system.
25
 By questioning the impartiality of 
liberal legalism, revolutionaries effectively portrayed the colonial legal system as alien and 
imposed, serving foreign rather than indigenous interests.
26
  
 
The different responses by nationalists and revolutionaries to colonial legalism are well 
illustrated in Vietnam. Following independence from the French in 1954, revolutionaries in 
Northern Vietnam increasingly turned to China and the Soviet Union for legal inspiration. 
Meanwhile, the nationalist Republic of Vietnam in the South retained much of the French 
colonial system until reunification in 1975.  
 
The Chinese and Vietnamese leadership today invoke foreign imposition as a tactic to resist calls 
by foreign and domestic actors for civil rights. They associate Western liberal legalism with 
caving into foreign domination. This strategy resonates strongly with the public who are 
instructed from infancy to feel humiliated and angry at the century of Western domination from 
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 See John Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, Cambridge Mass.: Belnap Press, 1999, pp.244–47. 
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26
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the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.
27
 Citizens are encouraged to believe that 
Western liberal legalism is something that is beyond their cognitive horizon, and does not 
constitute a denationalized, universally valid truth.  
 
Imposition through conditioning 
 
In an age where gunboat diplomacy is actively, if not always successfully, discouraged by 
international agencies, foreign impositions take the form of economic conditioning. Pressure to 
follow a particular regulatory path is applied through a combination of economic sanctions and 
incentives. China used this technique during the 1950s to promote its vision for radical land 
reform in Vietnam.
28
 Military and rural assistance was tied to progress in implementing class-
based land reforms. 
 
More recently, multi-lateral donor agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank have, with little apparent success, attempted to link development loans in China and 
Vietnam to particular legal and administrative reforms.
29
 Some commentators view the WTO-
                                                 
27
 See Daniel Lynch, Asian Democratization: Socialization to “Global Culture” in the Political Transformations of 
Thailand, China, and Taiwan, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, p.4; Matthieu Salomon and Vu Doan 
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eds., Education as a Political Tool in Asia, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, pp.139–56.  
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 See Edwin Moise, ‘Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam’, 49 Pacific Affairs, 1976, p.70. 
29
 See David Trubek and Alvaro Santos, eds., The New Law and Economic Development: Critical Appraisals, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
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Plus obligations that required China and Vietnam to implement reforms above those imposed on 
existing members as a type of conditioning.
30
 
 
Authors in this volume find little evidence that China uses conditioning to promote its law-
reform model in Vietnam. In fact, China has consistently rebuffed overtures by some Vietnamese 
leaders to form a socialist regulatory alliance against Western capitalism.
31
 Rather than 
promoting legal development, China uses soft loans, investment, and free trade deals to leverage 
access to raw materials and markets. In a recent example from mid-2008, the Vietnamese 
government, in return for economic support, controversially agreed to give a Chinese-
government-owned company preferential rights to mine bauxite deposits in an environmentally 
sensitive region in the Central Highlands.
32
   
 
Deference 
 
                                                 
30
 See Julia Ya Quin ‘Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System’, in 
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 See Alexander Vuving, ‘Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China Policy: A Changing Mixture of Pathways’, 
Asian Survey, vol.46, no.6, 2004, pp.805–24. 
32
 See ‘Vietnam and China: Bauxite Bashers’, The Economist, 23 April 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13527969, accessed 6 August 2009. 
13 
 
Deference occurs when recipients borrow from external sources that are considered prestigious, 
successful, or morally or spiritually superior.
33
 Vietnam’s deferential approach to Chinese 
thinking is anchored in pre-modern attitudes toward China. Given the vast asymmetry in size and 
capacity in the countries, deference of some kind is hardly surprising. Over the previous two 
thousand years, China’s population has remained about 15 times larger than Vietnam’s 
population. Not only has the disparity in size and power sensitized Vietnam to Chinese concerns, 
according to some commentators, it has given rise to a pattern of deference in which Vietnam 
has modified its strategic objectives, and even norms, to avoid conflicting with Chinese 
sovereignty claims.
34
 For example, during the many attempts by China to reimpose its authority 
over Vietnam by force, Vietnamese soldiers treated captured soldiers with the respect due to a 
great power.
35
 Similar privileges were not extended to soldiers from the Champa kingdom to the 
south. In contemporary times, Vietnamese leaders are careful to avoid antagonizing China, even 
if this sometimes means compromising on issues of sovereignty.
36
 
                                                 
33
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14 
 
 
In addition to asymmetric geopolitical power, deference to China is also attributable to the high 
esteem in which Confucian teachings, texts, and practices – the Confucian repertoire – are held 
in Vietnam. Pre-modern Vietnamese intellectuals divided people into two broad categories, 
efflorescents (Hoa) and barbarians (Di)].
37
 Efflorescents believed they had attained a 
sophisticated and integrated system of ritual and governance that was superior to the practices of 
people outside the Confucian world. For Vietnamese intellectuals, the boundary between Hoa 
and Di was not race based, since non-Chinese could, through learning and proper ritual practices, 
become efflorescent.  
The distinction between deference to China as a geopolitical entity and deference to the 
Confucian repertoire is illustrated by a story from the mid-nineteenth century.
38
 Ly Van Phuc, a 
scholarly official working for the Nguyen Dynasty, was sent on a diplomatic mission to Fujian 
Province in China. When he arrived, the accommodation set aside for his use bore a sign saying 
“Hostel for the An Nam [Vietnamese] Barbarians.” In a letter of complaint, Phuc explained that 
Vietnamese literati read and memorised the classic Song and Ming dynasty literature that 
epitomised (for the Vietnamese) the highpoint of neo-Confucian learning. He then argued that 
since the full classical repertoire was not taught under the Manchu dynasty, by implication 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China Policy: A Changing Mixture of Pathways’, Asian Survey, vol.46, no.6, 
2006, pp.819–24. 
37
 See Benjamin Elman, John Duncan, and Herman Ooms, ‘Introduction’, in Benjamin Elman, John Duncan, and 
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38
 See Liam Kelley ‘“Confucianism” in Vietnam: A State of Field Essay’, Journal of Vietnamese Studies, vol.1, 
no.1–2, 2006, pp.314–70. 
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Chinese officials were not entitled to claim moral superiority. Phuc made it clear that he deferred 
to an essentialized version of the neo-Confucian canon and not to particular Chinese emperors or 
to Chinese culture in general.  
 
Deference to Chinese statecraft declined when the neo-Confucian model offered no viable 
solution to growing western colonial power during the late nineteenth century. But the shift to 
socialist thinking among many of Vietnam’s anti-colonial leaders (and revolutionary leaders in 
China) did not precisely coincide with the decline of neo-Confucian rule or disenchantment with 
Western philosophy and science. Its timing and origin are much more complex.
39
  
 
During the 1920s, nationalist leaders in Vietnam looked to China’s Kuomintang for inspiration, 
but never managed to widely promote republican constitutionalism as a credible alternative to 
colonialism. There is no Vietnamese equivalent to China’s nationalist leaders such as Sun Yat- 
sen.  
 
Meanwhile, Vietnamese revolutionary leaders looked initially to China and then later to the 
Soviet Union for ideas about governance. As the revolutionary movement gained power during 
the 1940s, Chinese military, economic, and agricultural advisers increasingly influenced the anti-
colonial struggle, land reforms, as well as the ideological stance of the Communist Party of 
                                                 
39
 See Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986, 
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Indochina (the forerunner of the Vietnamese Communist Party).
40
 Maoist thinking peaked by the 
mid-1950s and was gradually displaced by Soviet thinking.
41
 As the most developed socialist 
state, Soviet laws and legal institutions were the preferred development model.
42
 The relationship 
with China deteriorated following the Sino–Soviet split in 1968, reaching a low point after the 
countries fought a brief border war in 1979. At this time, deference toward the Soviet worldview 
and antipathy to China prevented Chinese ideas from entering Vietnamese public discourse.
43
 
Nevertheless legal development in both countries followed the same general trajectory  during 
this period.  
 
Following doi moi (renovation) reforms in Vietnam in the mid-1980s,
44
 some, but certainly not 
all, Vietnamese leaders tried to bring Vietnamese legal, political, and economic thinking closer 
to China.
45
 Although deference to the Chinese development model has gradually increased, it is 
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now counterbalanced by a desire to learn from and engage with a broad range of countries. Until 
comparatively recently it was also constrained by limited Chinese language skills in Vietnam.
46
  
 
International integration 
 
International integration occurs where recipients voluntarily harmonize domestic regulatory 
structures with regional and international treaties. Emulating China’s multilateral foreign 
policy,
47
 the Vietnamese communist party at the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 expanded foreign 
relations to countries outside the Soviet bloc.
48
 A consensus emerged within the party that 
holistic borrowing from the Soviet model had led to the near collapse of the economy and 
Vietnam needed to attract investment from, and find markets in non-socialist countries. Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Co Thach steered Vietnamese foreign policy from a one-dimensional Soviet 
orientation to a multifaceted “friend to all” (da dang hoa, da phuong hoa) approach. He 
convinced senior party leaders that the world had experienced profound changes since the cold 
war period and the military threat posed by Western imperialism had diminished.
49
 His new 
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47
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49
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policy echoed Deng Xiaoping’s “four modernizations,” as it too recognized that Vietnam needed 
Western technology, capital, and know-how to develop.
50
 
 
Over the last 15 years the Vietnamese government entered into a series of multi- and bilateral 
trade and investment treaties to secure investment and international markets. Authors in this 
volume describe differences in the way treaties such as ASEAN, the US–Vietnam and Japan–
Vietnam bilateral trade agreements, and the WTO have reshaped governance structures in 
Vietnam. Vietnam has also entered a few cooperation agreements with China, but they fall well 
short of strategic alliances or comprehensive bilateral trade agreements like those signed with the 
US, Japan, and ASEAN.
51
 It is worth noting, however, that as a member of ASEAN, Vietnam 
will benefit from the China–ASEAN free trade agreement. 
 
Borrowing 
 
Borrowing happens when national elites look outside their stock of knowledge for solutions to 
domestic problems.
52
 This usually takes the form of learning among transnational elites. Vietnam 
has a long history of holistic borrowing. As we have seen, emperors in pre-modern times, 
especially since the fifteenth century, believed that effective neo-Confucian virtue-rule (duc tri) 
                                                 
50
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required the adoption of Chinese ideology, governmental organisations, and political-legal 
culture, and selective borrowing risked organisational disunity. For example, all but one of the 
398 articles in the Gia Long Code, enacted during the Nguyen Dynasty in the early nineteenth 
century, were either identical to, or closely based on, the Qing Code.
53
 This level of borrowing 
was unprecedented in other pre-colonial East Asian countries (with the possible exception of 
Korea) and foreshadowed the wholesale importation of the Soviet political-legal system 
centuries later.
54
 It is important to add, however, that Vietnamese leaders have demonstrated 
considerable flexibility and creativity in the implementation of imported ideas.
55
 
 
Like China, recent borrowing in Vietnam has been selective, and importantly, less deferential to 
the great powers.
56
 Nevertheless, four of the six basic principles in the doi moi policy drafted by 
the party in 1986 reflect reforms previously introduced by Deng Xiaoping in China – a debt that 
has not been officially acknowledged in Vietnam. Borrowing is most evident in the way 
Vietnamese leaders have followed China in attempting to instil within the citizenry a socialist 
morality that is robust enough to deal with challenges posed by the market economic and legal 
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reforms.
57
 They have also followed China in stressing the need for complimentary progress in 
both the economic, legal, and moral spheres. Leaders in both countries have a similar 
modernizing vision, one that encourages economic and material progress without embracing 
social and political pluralism.  
 
Authors in this volume show that even if the general trajectory of Vietnamese reforms follows 
the Chinese path, the details are often different. They explain that Vietnam imitated China’s 
multilateral trade policy, export orientation, open economy, protection for selected state-owned 
enterprises, and developmentalism. For example, Vietnamese lawmakers were initially 
concerned that left unchecked, imported capitalist economic principles would nurture a new 
capitalist class.58 As a corrective, they followed the Chinese model by giving state officials broad 
licensing powers to limit the scale of private business activities and economic sectors in which 
they could operate.  
 
In implementing this grand design, Vietnamese leaders looked to other models to avoid repeating 
China’s mistakes. As international economic integration gained momentum during the 1990s, 
lawmakers increasingly borrowed capitalist laws either directly from multilateral international 
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institutions such as the World Bank and UNDP, bilateral agencies such as USAID and DANIDA, 
or via third party Asian counties, especially Japan.
59
 The Law on Business Bankruptcy 1993, 
Civil Code 1995, Commercial Law 1997, and Enterprise Law 1999, for example, were all 
inspired by legal models supplied by bi- and multilateral donors.
 60
 Further distancing Vietnam 
from the Chinese model, non-state actors in Vietnam appear to exercise more influence over 
government policy than their counterparts in China.  Both Chinese and Vietnamese leaders have 
not allowed imported neoliberal commercial principles to disrupt state control over the 
“commanding heights” of the economy. On balance, however, the authors conclude that 
lawmakers in Vietnam have followed the Chinese development path, but have learned from a 
wide range of external and internal sources in formulating the particulars of the development 
model.   
Finally, it is worth noting that borrowing has not been entirely unidirectional. Recent political 
reforms in Vietnam have attracted interest in China.
61
 In the run-up to the Tenth Party Congress 
in 2006, two candidates applied for the top post of secretary general of the party. Although one 
candidate eventually withdrew, this event suggested that the central committee has more say 
about policy formulation than its counterpart in China. Some political scientists dispute the claim 
that electoral reforms give rise to more  political pluralism, because they doubt  whether 
decisions made in the Central Committee represent a broader cross-section of views than 
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decisions made by the Politburo.
62
 To support this view they  point to the considerable body of 
evidence that major decisions are prearranged to reflect shifting alliances between the party 
factions that control the Central Committee and the Politburo.
63
 Whatever the substance of the 
reforms, this episode is significant in showing that both China and Vietnam are looking to each 
other for solutions to domestic governance problems. 
 
Global diffusion 
 
Global diffusion offers a corrective to the other modes of comparison because it does not 
presuppose that states dominate legal and regulatory change. Rather, it suggests that the 
regulatory order in particular “core” countries diffuse through dialogical exchanges and other 
kinds of communication to peripheral countries.
64
 For example, the exchange of ideas that occurs 
in law reforms projects, INGO projects, and commercial transactions such as supply chain 
agreements persuade actors in peripheral countries to adopt global ideas. Global diffusion 
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emphasizes the importance of shared conceptual languages, close economic ties, and educational 
linkages in spreading reform.
65
  
 
Authors in this volume provide ample evidence that global legal ideas diffuse into China and 
Vietnam. They find evidence that along with transnational social and economic linkages, state 
ideology plays a role in determining what global ideas appear attractive and what social groups 
import them. Both Shi and Nguyen argue in this volume that business associations in China and 
Vietnam became progressively more active in adopting global legal ideas as ideological and 
regulatory controls over the private sector were relaxed. Nguyen shows the some global legal 
ideas bypass state and quasi-state institutions (such as business associations) and are 
disseminated through supply chains and investment agreements to state and non-state actors. He 
gives the example of the Business Ethics and Code of Conduct that Intel Corporation signed with 
a state-owned industrial park in Ho Chi Minh. It compels the local corporation to collaborate 
with Intel in monitoring and preventing corruption. This evidence of bottom-up lawmaking is 
important as it questions state mythologizing that legal development flows exclusively from 
farsighted action by the political leaders.  
 
To summarize, the five modes of comparison provide multiple perspectives from which to view 
the complex interaction between China and Vietnam. Vietnam has a long history of deference 
toward Chinese, and more recently to Soviet modes of governance. Since doi moi reforms began 
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over two decades ago, the Vietnamese state has pursued a multilateral international policy that 
balances deference to the Chinese illiberal legal model with a desire to learn from and attract 
investment from other developed regions. As China’s economic power grows, it is possible that 
the Vietnamese state will be manoeuvred into a more dependent relationship that constrains its 
capacity to selectively borrow from other systems.  
 
However, there are several factors working against convergence. Although Vietnam experienced 
social instability caused by decades of war, it did not follow China in staging its own cultural 
revolution. As Fu Hualing and Pip Nicholson point out in this volume, one important 
consequence is that party leaders in Vietnam, in contrast to their counterparts in China, did not 
look to legality or court reform as a means of restoring social stability. 
 
The diffusion of global ideas constitutes another check on Chinese influence. As Shi and Nguyen 
show, Chinese firms have not so far used trade and investment linkages to convey state-
sponsored development ideas into Vietnam. At the same time telecommunications, foreign 
investment and trade, and international travel have made global ideas much less dependent on 
state sponsorship than in the past. Global diffusion has given hybrid and non-state actors in 
China and Vietnam new ideas to reinterpret, transmogrify, and even resist state sponsored legal 
reforms.  
 
Finally, it is useful to observe that the Chinese development model does not challenge the entire 
Western development schemata. Both models share a modernist faith in progress and the state’s 
capacity to instrumentally engineer outcomes, as well as the need to abolish pre-industrial 
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notions about human dependency on nature. Their major point of departure regards the role of 
pluralism (especially political pluralism) and individual rights in society. The Chinese model 
also implicitly rejects the universality and denationalized claims made by Western global 
narratives. 
 
An Overview of Some of the Issues and Findings in this Volume 
 
The chapters in this volume seek to describe and understand the legal reforms that have taken 
place in China and Vietnam in the last three decades in their political, economic, social and 
cultural contexts. Some of the issues raised by the authors, and the major findings made by them, 
may be summarised under the following inquiries: 
 What progress, if any, has been made in China and Vietnam in the last three decades in 
the domain of legal reform and the development of the Rule of Law?  
 What, if any, is the relationship between legal development and economic reform in 
China and Vietnam? 
 What, if any, is the relationship between legal development and the political system in 
China and Vietnam? 
 To what extent has the legal reform changed the traditional or pre-existing legal culture in 
the two countries? 
 How should we evaluate the legal reform that has taken place in the two countries, and 
what is the likely trajectory of legal development in future? 
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Progress in legal reform  
 
This volume provides ample evidence that the governments in both China and Vietnam, led by 
their respective Communist Party, have actively pursued the agenda of legal development in the 
last three decades. These reforms have: emphasized the importance of law by making official 
pronouncements, enacted numerous laws and regulations, promoted a socialist law-based state 
and public administration in accordance with law, developed  the court system, the legal 
profession, legal aid and legal education, and increased participation in the international legal 
framework as well as the assumption of treaty obligations under international law.  
 
The chapters by Chen and Gillespie provide an account of the development of official thinking 
and ideology regarding law and legality in China and Vietnam in the last thirty years. Readers 
may discern strikingly similar development trajectories, such as the  increased emphasis on the 
importance of law and on the value of a state operated on the basis of “socialist” rule of law. 
China’s economic and legal reforms began in 1978 when the Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to abandon ultra-leftist 
policies and embark on the path of gaige kaifang (reform and open door). In Vietnam, the 
corresponding landmark was the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1986 
which officially proclaimed the doi moi (renovation) reform. In China, the new Constitution of 
1982 affirms the supremacy of the Constitution and the law by providing that all state organs and 
political parties must abide by the Constitution and the law, and the new CCP constitution of 
1982 expressly declares that the CCP shall operate within the framework of the Constitution and 
the law. In Vietnam, the same principle that state organs and the Communist Party shall operate 
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within the Constitution and the law was affirmed in the new Constitution of 1992. Earlier, in 
1991, the Vietnamese Communist Party at its Seventh Congress adopted the concept of nha nuoc 
phap quyen (the law-based state, derived from the Soviet term pravovoe gosudarstvo as pointed 
out in Gillespie’s chapter), and this notion was incorporated into the Vietnamese Constitution 
when it was amended in 2001. In China, the equivalent concept of fazhi guojia (translated in 
Chen’s chapter as “the Rule of Law state”) was endorsed by the Fifteenth Congress of the CCP 
in 1997 and written into the Constitution by the constitutional amendment of 1999. As regards 
human rights, this concept received constitutional recognition in the Vietnamese Constitution of 
1992, and in the 2004 amendment to the Chinese Constitution.  
 
With regard to Vietnam, Gillespie points out in his chapter that “governance is undergoing 
juridification”, and that although “for most of Vietnam’s history, law-based regulation played a 
relatively minor role”, “during the last two decades, juridical thinking has moved from the 
fringes to center stage in Vietnamese discourse.” Precisely the same may be said for China. As 
Fu puts it in his chapter on access to justice in China: “Law did not only represent the new 
normative order, but a new way of thinking, a new religion. Through legalization, the Party-State 
aimed at achieving a framework in which every social problem required, and was provided with, 
a new legal solution. … Law was replacing the failed political ideology to legitimize the Party-
State.” Indeed, the idea that increasing reliance on legality may be understood at least partly as a 
device to bolster the communist regime’s legitimacy in China and Vietnam appears in several 
chapters in this volume.  
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One of the main elements of building a law-based state is to reform the operation of state 
executive organs so as to (in the words of Salomon and Vu in this volume) “[shift] from 
administrative fiat to a more rights-based public law; from administrative/political orders to laws 
and rights; from secrecy and omnipotence to transparency and accountability”, and to establish 
(in Zheng’s words in this volume) a “type of government [that] satisfies Max Weber’s criteria for 
a legal-rational type of authority”.  The chapters by Zheng and by Salomon and Vu (and to some 
extent also the chapters by Chen and Gillespie) document the efforts that the governments in 
China and Vietnam have made in this regard in the last two to three decades.  
For example, Zheng cites three important policy documents on law-based public administration 
promulgated by the Chinese government in 1999, 2004 and 2008 respectively. It is possible to 
also consider the enactment in China in 2007 of the Regulations on Disclosure of Government 
Information a breakthrough. In Vietnam, public administration reform (PAR) was initiated at a 
Party Plenum in 1995, and is now governed by the PAR Programme for 2001-2010 promulgated 
in 2001. In China, administrative litigation – by which citizens may challenge the legality of 
governmental actions in court – was institutionalized by the Law of Administrative Litigation 
1989. In Vietnam, courts began to handle administrative litigation in 1996. Salomon and Vu 
show that one of the goals of administrative reform in Vietnam is to establish “a public service 
accountable to citizens”. Zheng and Leng in their chapters on China also refer to the similar 
concept of the “service-oriented government” endorsed by the Seventeenth Congress of the CCP 
in 2007. Interesting, both the chapters by Zheng and by Salomon and Vu highlight the 
introduction in China and Vietnam respectively of the “one-stop service” or “one-stop shop” to 
improve public dealings with government departments, which Zheng considers to be an example 
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of “middle-level institutional designs” that can contribute to the improvement of public 
administration in China.  
 
In a modern legal system, apart from the laws themselves and their implementation, the levels of 
development of the courts, the legal profession, legal aid and legal education are all important 
indicators of the level of development of the legal system itself. In this volume, Fu and 
Nicholson write about the courts and access to justice in China and Vietnam; Conner and Bui 
write about legal education and the legal profession in the two countries. These four chapters 
collectively provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the evolution and present circumstances of 
the relevant legal institutions in the two countries. Empirical and  legislative data is presented 
which demonstrates the rapid expansion of the court system and the legal profession that has 
taken place in China and Vietnam over the last two to three decades, the trend towards 
professionalization in the judiciary and among lawyers, the increasing demand for legal services, 
the movement towards privatization and marketization of lawyers’ practice, the rising number of 
court cases, the development of legal aid, and the growth of legal education and training in the 
two countries. It is noteworthy that some significant developments only occurred relatively 
recently.  For example, Conner points out that the number of Chinese law schools doubled 
between 1999 and 2005; 376 new law schools were opened between 2000 and 2005. There was a 
twelve-fold increase in the number of law students between 1992 and 2003. China now has over 
600 law schools with a student population of 450,000. In the case of Vietnam, Bui mentions in 
her chapter that the Hanoi Law University – “the first post-colonial tertiary-level law school” – 
was only established in 1979, and the number of law schools has grown since then to 20 in the 
year 2008. She also notes that whereas there were only about 800 lawyers in the whole of 
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Vietnam in 1997, by 2007 the number increased to 4,000, while China had about 150,000 
lawyers at this time (as compared with only a few thousand lawyers in the early 1980s) as noted 
by Conner.
66
 In his commentary on the chapters by Conner and Bui, Cohen suggests that the 
different levels of development of the legal profession and legal education in China and Vietnam 
can be partially explained by the “relevant pre-Communist experience of the two countries”, and 
partly by “the fact that Vietnam’s revolutionary war concluded a generation after China’s did”. 
 
Similar trends may be observed in the development of the legal profession and legal aid in China 
and Vietnam as recounted by Conner, Bui, Fu and Nicholson. Booth notes in his commentary in 
this volume, there exist “fundamental similarities which transcend the differences between the 
two legal systems and their stage and pace of development.” In China, the restoration of the legal 
profession (after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution era) began with the enactment of the 
Provisional Regulations on Lawyers in 1980, under which lawyers were “state legal workers” 
and could not engage in private practice. In Vietnam, the first set of regulations on lawyers 
enacted in the doi moi era was the 1987 Ordinance on Lawyers Organization which, like the 
Chinese regulations of 1980, did not allow private practice by lawyers. In China, quasi-private 
practice by lawyers in “cooperative law firms” were allowed in 1988, and full private practice in 
partnership law firms was permitted in 1993. The Lawyers Law was enacted in 1996; it 
abandoned the idea in the Provisional Regulations that lawyers were state legal workers, and 
recognized that lawyers were professionals providing services to members of the public. In 
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Vietnam, the Ordinance on Lawyers, enacted in 2001, introduced a similar policy that permitted 
lawyers to set up their own law firms. The Law on Lawyers, passed in 2006, further entrenched 
this reform.  
Whereas the All-China Lawyers’ Association was established in China in 1986, its Vietnamese 
counterpart – the Vietnamese Bar Federation – only came into existence in 2009. Although in 
both countries provincial bar associations had existed for many years. The Chinese and 
Vietnamese governments have sought to regulate lawyers by combining state control and 
supervision with self-regulation by professional associations of lawyers. 
 
Compared with the legal profession, the development of legal aid is a more recent phenomenon 
in both China and Vietnam. Fu points out in his chapter that legal aid in China started to develop 
in 1994, but the legal aid system should be seen in the context of the larger system of legal 
services which includes as its branches not only lawyers but also “barefoot lawyers”, “judicial 
assistants” and “township legal workers”. The system of legal aid was only formalized in 2003 
with the enactment of the Legal Aid Regulations.
67
 In the case of Vietnam, Nicholson traces the 
origins of legal aid to a government directive in 1996 to establish a “Legal Aid network”. The 
Law on Legal Aid was enacted in 2006 in Vietnam.  
 
Legal development and economic reform 
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The extraordinary growth in legality and juridification in China and Vietnam mentioned in the 
preceding section corresponds closely with the equally extraordinary economic development in 
the two countries. According to conventional law and development theory,  some practice of 
legality or some form of the rule of law – particularly rules that  protect  private property rights 
and the enforcement of contracts – is a prerequisite for  a successful market economy. However 
the case of China and Vietnam in the last few decades may cast doubt on, or at least demand 
modifications to this thesis.
68
 Peerenboom in this volume argues that “China and Vietnam are not 
exceptions to the general rule that sustained growth requires rule of law. A functional legal 
system has played an important part in growth in China and to some extent in Vietnam as well.” 
He identifies “both a push and a pull aspect” in the relationship between legal and economic 
development: “a stronger legal system facilitates economic development and economic growth 
increases demands for legal reforms.”  
 
The economic reforms in both China and Vietnam included as one of their most crucial 
components opening up the country to foreign trade and investment and pursuing integration 
with the global market economy. The law – including the making of domestic law and the 
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assumption of treaty obligations under international law -- has played an important role at least 
in signaling the major developments in this regard. As Leng mentions in her chapter on 
commercial regulatory reform in China, one of the first laws made in China to inaugurate the era 
of “reform and opening” was the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of 1979. The parallel 
development in Vietnam was the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law in 1987. Major legal 
reforms in China and Vietnam were prompted by their accession to the WTO in 2001 and 2007 
respectively, and in the case of Vietnam also by the bilateral trade agreement it entered into with 
the U.S.A. in 2001.  
 
At the same time as encouraging the influx of foreign capital, the two countries also fostered the 
growth of domestic business and the private sector of the economy. In China, the first law on 
domestic private business firms – the Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises – was 
introduced in 1988.
69
 In Vietnam, domestic private commerce, hitherto prohibited under 
socialism, was decriminalized in the same year. In China, the constitutional amendments of 1988, 
1993, 1999 and 2004 all affirmed and elevated step by step the importance of the non-state or 
private sector of the economy; the 1993 amendment declared that China would practice a 
“socialist market economy”, and the 2004 amendment gave increased formal recognition to 
private property rights. In Vietnam, the 1992 Constitution provides for a “multi-component 
commodity economy functioning in accordance with market mechanisms”, and the 2001 
amendment further expands the permissible scope of private business activities. In China, the 
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constitutional amendment of 1988 provided the legal basis for the privatization and 
marketization of property rights in land. In Vietnam, the Land Law of 1993 began to permit 
“horizontal land transfers” and paved the way for the emergence of a real estate market a decade 
later.  
 
In both China and Vietnam, special legal regimes were initially created to cater for the interests 
of foreign investors. Different sets of laws and regulations governed the business activities of 
different types of firms depending on their sources of capital – which might come from the 
sectors of “state ownership” or “collective ownership”, domestic entrepreneurs, foreign investors 
or a combination of some of these sources. Thus Leng describes in her chapter a “dual-track, 
differentiating regulation of domestic and foreign-invested enterprises” in China, and the gradual 
movement in the legal reform towards “a level playing field” for all market participants in the 
Chinese economy as evidenced by the enactment of laws such as the Uniform Contract Law, the 
Corporate Income Tax Law and the Anti-Monopoly Law. In Vietnam, the government also 
established a “dual-track” regulatory regime initially, and then sequentially implemented reforms 
designed to create “a level playing field” for the public and private sectors. As Beresford notes in 
her chapter on Vietnamese commercial regulation, the new Enterprise Law of 2005 “puts SEs 
[state enterprises] and private firms on the same footing.” 
 
Both Leng and Beresford stress the path-dependent nature of the evolution of commercial 
regulation in China and Vietnam, and the fact that the starting point was a centrally planned 
economy in which the state was the owner of all economic resources. From this starting point, 
China and Vietnam have embarked upon the journey towards what Leng calls the “regulatory 
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state” in which the state uses law and other means to regulate business activities in an evolving 
market economy. In both countries, foreign-invested enterprises and domestic private enterprises 
were allowed to flourish; many state enterprises have undergone partial or wholesale 
privatization, including the “corporatization and shareholding reform” described by Leng and the 
“equitization” described by Beresford. But in both countries, the state has retained control of 
enterprises and business operations in the “commanding heights” of the economy. This has 
resulted in a situation in which, as Leng observes, the state plays a dual role as “both a regulator 
and a participant in the market”, and a separation of the two roles is essential if effective 
regulation is to be achieved. It seems that progress in this regard has been made in both China 
and Vietnam. In China, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
was created in 2003 to perform the functions of state owner. In Vietnam, a State Capital 
Investment Corporation began operations in 2006, which, as Beresford points out in her chapter, 
can “hopefully [remove] the clear conflict of interest that previously existed when the line 
ministries were both owners and regulators of SEs.” 
 
Another aspect of the path-dependent nature of economic development and regulation in China 
and Vietnam stems from a fact identified by Clarke in his commentary in this volume: in both 
countries, “the commercial sector itself first emerges in a significant way out of the business 
activities of the state, and the first private entrepreneurs (at least on a scale large enough to 
become rich and influential) are well-connected former officials or their relatives.” In 
Beresford’s words, “The networks of economic power that emerged during the transition from 
central planning remained influential, linking various sectors of the Party and bureaucracy with 
SEs and privately owned SMEs in ways that continue to be politically negotiated and 
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renegotiated over time.” The “dividing line between public and private sectors is blurred”, and 
market relations are embedded in “social networks of power and influence”. In these 
circumstances, “legal regulation is widely regarded as irrelevant”. Although Beresford makes 
these observations with regard to Vietnam, they are also largely applicable to China, where the 
distinction between state capital and private capital is often blurred and social networks 
involving officials and entrepreneurs play a crucial role in economic activities.
70
 Beresford 
borrows the term “alliance capitalism”, originally invented to describe the close state-business 
relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in her analysis of commercial regulation in 
Vietnam, and concludes that alliance capitalism “has served the Vietnamese nation-building 
project very well”. Similarly, Leng opines that China has borrowed much from the “North East 
Asian model” of the developmental state. However, Dowdle in his commentary points out that 
although both China and Vietnam have adopted “state-led developmental strategies”, they have 
different industrial structures reflecting their different comparative advantages in the global 
economy, which might impel them in the future to pursue divergent paths in economic regulation.  
 
In her chapter on “bottom-up” regulation in China, Shi uses the concept of “state corporatism” to 
describe the relationship between the state and what she calls “business associations” -- 
associations formed by business and industrial firms to represent their interests. She notes that 
the state created most of these associations in contemporary China. They receive funding from 
the state and are often staffed by retired officials or persons with government background. Their 
autonomy is therefore limited, nevertheless they play a role in lobbying and liaising with the 
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government and otherwise participating in policy and  law-making processes. In contrast to 
domestic associations, she concludes that foreign business associations in China are particularly 
active in representing their members’ interests and bargaining with the government.  
 
In his chapter on non-state actors and the regulatory environment in Vietnam, Nguyen observes 
that “social associations” (a terms that corresponds to Shi’s “business associations”) such as the 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry – a “quasi-state organization” –participate in 
policy-making and law-making processes. Foreign investors have been active in pressuring the 
Vietnamese government to join relevant international conventions, conclude bilateral trade 
agreements and to improve the rule of law. He notes that “International donor agencies, 
especially the UNDP, Asia Development Bank, and bilateral agencies play a central role in 
advocating law reform in Vietnam.”  
 
Legal development and the political system 
 
Although the Chinese and Vietnamese states have promoted law and legal institutions to 
stimulate economic development, they have been cautious in ensuring that legal reform would 
not sow the seeds for challenges to the Communist Party’s monopoly of political power. The 
rejection of political liberalization and democratization thus constitutes an outer limit to the 
extent to which legal reform may go – the extent to which constitutional rights may become truly 
enforceable, the extent to which the courts may become truly independent, the extent to which 
the legal profession may become free of political control and truly self-regulating, and the extent 
to which legal discourse may be used to pressurize the Party-State to become truly accountable 
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to the people for how it exercises power. Various chapters in this volume describe this tension 
between legal development and political power.  
 
Chen and Gillespie demonstrate that the principle of “the leadership of the Communist Party” is 
still supreme and sacrosanct in China and Vietnam. The introduction of a “functional” separation 
between Party and State organs in the two countries, discussed by Gillespie, Zheng, and Salomon 
and Vu, has not weakened or diminished the Communist Parties’ authority and influence. Both 
China and Vietnam inherited from the Soviet Union the idea that the constitution coordinates  
rather than checks or constrains the power of the Party-State. They also inherited  “the unity of 
powers” doctrine that justifies the (nominal) concentration of power in the National People’s 
Congress (in the case of China) and the National Assembly (in the case of Vietnam). This 
doctrine limits the  power of state institutions other than the legislature to interpret the 
constitution, thus constraining the establishment of an independent institution (such as a 
constitutional court) with powers to interpret the constitution and safeguard its implementation.  
In addition to the Soviet heritage in Vietnam, Gillespie suggests that after Vietnam joined 
ASEAN in 1994, its “leaders were especially attracted to the Malaysian and Singaporean models 
where neoliberal deregulation and privatization did not signal a retreat from state control” and 
“the illiberal constitutionalism practiced in these countries seemed to offer a way to develop a 
sophisticated commercial regulatory system without exciting social demand for political and 
civil rights.” This, apparently, has also been the agenda pursued by the Chinese Party-State.  
 
Salomon and Vu in their chapter on Vietnam refer to “a dualist thinking, mixing ‘rule of law’ 
and ‘rule of the Party’”. This is reminiscent of the current Chinese theory of “the three 
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supremes” mentioned in Chen’s chapter – the supremacy of the Party’s cause, the supremacy of 
the interests of the people, and the supremacy of the Constitution and the law. Salomon and Vu 
point out that “in practice the Party’s regulations still trump laws” in Vietnam, and “people 
cannot legally complain about the Party’s decisions and regulations.” This is also the case in 
China where the system of administrative litigation may only be used to challenge state 
administrative actions but not Party decisions or norms. This policy leads Dowdle to conclude 
that “much political regulation lies outside the reach of the public law system” in China and 
Vietnam.  
 
Fu, Nicholson, Conner and Bui provide further illustrations showing how the Party’s monopoly 
over political power limits the development of the rule of law. Fu observes that although rights 
talk and practice have been permitted or even encouraged by the Chinese state in “less political 
spheres” such as equality and anti-discrimination, courts are weak and legal norms are fragile 
when confronted by the authoritarian Party-State. In particular, he explains that Chinese courts 
have neither the power nor capacity to handle politically sensitive cases (such as cases involving 
“national security”) and what Peerenboom calls “growing pains” cases – cases generated by the 
difficult choices (such as a tradeoff between social justice and economic growth) and sacrifices 
that have to be made as a poor nation embarks on the road to economic development. They 
include disputes about land taking, reform of state-owned enterprises and related labor disputes, 
and environmental problems. In Fu’s words, “Courts cannot save us from a Hobbesian world” or 
one in which “legislative and regulatory chaos” abound.  
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In a similar vein, Nicholson points out that the Vietnamese Party-State’s approach to legal 
reform has been a “cautious and controlling” one. “Multiple narratives” co-exist; “only 
incremental and uneven increases in access to legal infrastructure and discourse” have been 
allowed. “The uncertainty about the ultimate reform narrative gives rise to conflicts, tensions, 
and disagreements about the role of law, lawyers, and legal institutions”. These observations are 
also pertinent to the case of China. Several stories are told by Nicholson, Cohen, Conner and Bui 
showing how some “vocal minorities” of lawyers in China and Vietnam have struggled for a 
greater degree of professional self-regulation or have devoted themselves to using the law to 
serve, protect and defend weak and underprivileged members of society (e.g. the weiquan or 
“rights protection” lawyers in China).71 But as Cohen suggests in his commentary, in both China 
and Vietnam “the Soviet-style Party-State structure … tightly controls the legal profession, 
monitoring and often squelching independent efforts to promote law reform. The leadership in 
both countries is determined to prevent the growth of an autonomous legal profession”.  
 
Legal reform and the traditional or pre-existing legal culture 
 
Apart from the political considerations of the Party-State that set an external limit to the possible 
reach of legal development, there exists also what may be called an internal limit to legal 
development or the effectiveness of legal reform that is constituted by the traditional or pre-
existing legal culture of the society concerned. Here “legal culture” refers to the attitudes, values, 
mentality as well as the modes of behavior of people or actors in government, society and the 
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economy that may be relevant to the operation of law and the legal system. Various chapters in 
this volume demonstrate the nature and operation of such internal limits and legal culture in 
China and Vietnam. We offer four specific examples. 
 
First, law on the books will only be translated into law in action in a legal culture that supports 
the implementation of the law. In China and with the limited exception of colonial Vietnam, law 
did not play a significant role in the political, economic and social system before current legal 
reforms began two to three decades ago. Prior to reforms, Party policy documents and 
administrative directives rather than laws were the primary instrument of governance. Legal 
reforms have now brought into existence an elaborate hierarchy of legal norms with some 
situated at higher levels and some at lower levels. Several chapters in this volume show that in 
practice, there is in both China and Vietnam considerable inconsistency and conflict between 
legal norms, particularly between superior legislation and subordinate rules. This suggests that 
lower level organs and officials involved in local rule-making have not yet developed a culture 
of respect for and compliance with higher level legal norms. It also implies that the legal system 
has not been sufficiently internalized by power-holders in the state apparatus. In both countries, 
the problem of inconsistent legal rules has been further aggravated by what Salomon and Vu call 
the “institutional fragmentation” of the state apparatus and the lack of an effective system for 
review the legality of norms.  
 
Secondly, as several authors in this volume argue, provincial and local authorities in both China 
and Vietnam may not faithfully implement laws enacted by the national legislature. This practice 
can be understood as an aspect of legal culture – local officials have not yet developed the habit 
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of or cultivated the mentality of strict observance and enforcement of laws enacted by the 
supreme legislature. Laws may have been enacted but the supporting legal culture has not yet 
come into existence. Gillespie observes that after Vietnam introduced the Enterprise Law in 1999 
“to deregulate market access by abolishing licensing gateways used by local authorities …, 
[m]any local officials responded by creating new licenses and permits to replace those abrogated 
by the Law.” Similarly, Leng notes “the unsatisfactory result of downsizing administrative 
licenses to do business” in China: the Law on Administrative Licensing enacted in 2003 “has 
seen poor-to-mixed implementation at local government levels”. She cites this as an example of 
“the possibility of divergent interests and policy considerations between central and local 
governments”. Salomon and Vu link the traditional saying in Vietnam that “The King’s Law 
gives in to the village’s one”, with contemporary governance. They note that local leaders are 
influenced by a “‘political contract’ that follows these general lines: we do not care how you 
manage your province/district/village, as long as you produce economic growth without political 
instability.” This analysis is largely applicable to China as well.  
 
Thirdly, several chapters in this volume suggest that citizens in China and Vietnam have not yet 
developed sufficient trust in the legal and judicial systems or a habit of turning to the law and 
legal institutions to solve problems (as distinguished from relying on personal relationships, 
social networks or resorting to political and administrative channels). Zheng mentions this point 
in his chapter on Chinese administrative law. Although there is more administrative litigation in 
China relative to Vietnam (even after taking into account the difference in population), less than 
2 per cent of the cases accepted by the Chinese courts for trial in 1996-2004 concerned 
administrative action. Zheng also cites survey results showing that most people in China choose 
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not to take any further action when they have disputes with administrative organs, and the 
minority who take action prefer mediation or taking their grievances to the government itself to 
going to court.  
 
Making a similar argument, Nguyen observes that after taking into account the population 
difference, litigation has been used less in Vietnam than in China as a means of dispute 
resolution, not only for disputes involving the government but generally in civil disputes. 
“People do not expect to settle their disputes in court, or as a proverb puts it: ‘try not to go to 
court’.” The chapters by Salomon and Vu and by Nicholson further suggest that people in 
Vietnam have a very low level of trust in the legal system, laws, courts, and lawyers. Nicholson 
also notes that “Vietnamese people ‘lack the habit’ of using lawyers” and do not have a “public 
instinct to turn to the law and to legality to resolve disputes”.  
 
Fourthly, several authors in this volume draw our attention to the age-old tradition in China and 
Vietnam of (a) reliance on personal connections and social networks to do business; (b) dispute 
resolution through  mediation, and (c) attaching more importance to “sentiment and reason” than 
to law as a means of regulating human behavior. Naturally, this tradition or culture is 
inconsistent with and resistant to “juridification”. The chapters by Zheng and by Salomon and 
Vu stress that in China and Vietnam, personal relationships and social networks play an 
important role in citizens’ dealings with the administration (sometimes involving corruption). 
Salomon and Vu write: “The first reference of both civil servants and citizens is not the law or 
rights, but ‘who.’ ‘Who’ is asking you for the service (favor)? ‘Who’ do you know in the 
administration that will be able to help you?” Precisely the same point is made by Zheng, who in 
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his chapter cites an example from his personal experience. Zheng goes on to mention that China 
is a “sentiment-reason based society”, and “[r]eason and sentiment in carrying out the law as 
vividly described in Salomon and Vu’s chapter also applies to China.” This means that – as 
Booth puts it in his commentary – even “courts draw heavily on local norms and moral narratives 
in deciding cases rather than legal precepts”.  
 
Nguyen provides a detailed discussion of self-regulation and informal dispute resolution in 
Vietnamese villages. He shows that that “village authorities are able to dispense contextually 
relevant forms of justice. Village elders live among the people and have a rich, nuanced 
knowledge about community norms and tacit understandings and can apply ‘reason and 
sentiment’ to resolve disputes.” A similar point is made by Fu in his account of the revival of 
emphasis on mediation by courts in China and on the increasing attention paid to indigenous 
customary norms: “courts are rediscovering the virtues of customs and using them to supplement, 
if not to replace, legal provisions.” Finally, it should also be noted that mediation has a long 
history in both China and Vietnam and is considered an important characteristic of their 
traditional legal culture.
72
 As we saw in the chapters by Fu, Nicholson and Nguyen, the modern 
socialist states in China and Vietnam have invested much in building a system of local grassroots 
mediation as a major means of dispute resolution and maintenance of social order.  
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Evaluation and forecast  
 
It appears from the preceding review that the similarities in legal development in China and 
Vietnam in the last three decades are substantial and significant. Although the relatively few 
differences do not imply different development trajectories, there is strong evidence to suggest 
that reforms are influenced by different path dependencies and stages of development. What has 
emerged in the two countries resembles what Peerenboom in this volume calls a “two-track legal 
system” in which the rule of law is promoted in the economic domain, but civil and political 
rights are not respected and protected by law, and the judiciary lack the independence to 
effectively review party and state power. This mode of legal development has attracted much 
criticism. The chief objection is that law reform aims only to strengthen and legitimize the Party 
and State and fails to promote and realize human rights and human development, which this 
critiques presumes is the ultimate purpose of the rule of law.  
 
However, Peerenboom in his chapter puts forward a powerful defense of legal development in 
China and Vietnam that he associates with an “East Asian Model” of development.73 The 
defense is based on the notion of “sequencing”: it may be appropriate, legitimate, prudent or at 
least pragmatically a sound strategy for a poor nation to pursue economic development first 
before proceeding to democratization; the development of the market, the rule of law and the 
building of relevant institutions of a modern society may properly come before the full-scale 
practice of electoral democracy. Peerenboom argues on the basis of both empirical evidence and 
sociopolitical analysis that countries pursuing democratization while they are at low levels of 
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economic development often experience major problems such as social instability, human rights 
violations and political violence; “transitional or illiberal democracies” may also be repressive: 
“as political space opens, the ruling regime is subject to greater threats to its power and so resorts 
to violence.” On the other hand, “[a]rguably, authoritarian regimes are better suited to lower 
levels of development because they can force through tough economic decisions and maintain 
social stability, albeit by restricting civil and political rights”. Peerenboom thus concludes that 
there are “preconditions” for successful democratization, such as a certain level of wealth, the 
existence of certain effective institutions (including the market and the Rule of Law), and the 
development of a civil society. His views return us to the proposition outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter that we should avoid the assumption that legal development in China and Vietnam 
has been or will be based on a western liberal template.  
If Peerenboom is right, then China and Vietnam have indeed followed the correct legal 
development path over the last three decades, given their initial social, political and economic 
conditions. The mode of legal development that they have adopted may have contributed to their 
spectacular economic growth. On this view the repression associated with maintaining the 
Communist Partys’ monopoly of power may be the price that the people of China and Vietnam 
have paid and are still paying in return for economic development. This thesis is of course 
controversial, as critics will no doubt question whether the same increase in material wealth 
could have been achieved without such heavy handed repression of civil liberties, or whether the 
price is worth paying for material wealth.  
 
In predicting the future, Peerenboom recognizes that the “two-track legal system” is not going to 
stay or should not stay indefinitely. “[T]here is an emerging consensus that while the EAM [East 
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Asian Model] is useful during the catch-up phase, it is not so effective later.” “[T]he legal system 
is likely to play a more important role as China and Vietnam attempt to move from middle-
income to high-income status.” Peerenboom goes on to note that “sequencing did work in Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan”74 and that democracy – subject to local interpretations and in a form 
adapted to local culture and circumstances -- thrives in these countries today. Thus for him 
“sequencing” only means postponing democratization until a certain level of economic 
development has been achieved. Far from rejecting democratization, his argument seems to 
imply that democratization is necessary and inevitable at a later stage. Peerenboom observes that 
“after democratization, the courts in South Korea and Taiwan were able to quickly step into the 
role of more aggressively protecting civil and political rights”. Will these legal pictures of South 
Korea and Taiwan today be those of China and Vietnam tomorrow? On questions like this, 
readers of this volume are invited to form their own judgment as they read the interesting and 
exciting stories of legal reform in China and Vietnam told in the following chapters.  
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